The problems of populism: tactics for Western universities

Duncan Wu's piece is wonderfully revealing of the very Georgetown blinkers he professes to gently skewer in his opening. He says the Georgetown set can't help it since they are who they are. Just so, and true too of Dr. Wu. First let's consider how Dr. Wu thinks about the "other" that he would hope to explain to his brethren. They are "impoverished Alabamans and Mississippians"--though the actual profile of Trump supporters shows them as much more diverse than this comforting Southern Gothic stereotype. They are "rural voters of the swing states", even though in most of the swing states the action is hardly at the rural level. They are the "poorly educated" who cannot rationally fathom that Trump is not advocating for their interests--assuming, as Dr. Wu would have it, that their interests consist mainly of enhanced access to "private school and Ivy League education" and not things as prosaic as jobs and community. Mostly, though, "they" are the Evangelicals. Indeed the Evangelicals still loom large at Georgetown, well after their influence has dimmed in the current political moment. The article also has a couple of instances of dogs that didn't bark. Dr. Wu reports that those impoverished Alabamans and Mississippians "even now" remain loyal to Trump--that is, after all of those sordid reports of his "molesting women whenever the mood seized him" (not what he said but let's not quibble that one here). Is there any reflection here on whether "even now" might be a suitable frame for reflexive support for Clinton as well, after all those sordid reports of Foundation pay-for-play and fast and loose emailing? No, it is only those durned bitter-clingers that bitterly cling to their candidate in the face of sordid reports. And what to make of the truly odd argument about Gary Hart: "(w)hat an extraordinary situation, when you consider how rapid was the descent of Democrat president-in-waiting Gary Hart, who in 1988 was merely alleged to have had an extramarital affair." It is almost as if President Clinton's dalliances--and I use that gentle word when I could use more brutal ones--never happened in the interim, and that the current Democratic nominee had no complicity in those . . . dalliances. Dr. Wu closes with a nice rhetorical flourish: "I’ll wait for the results before breaking open the Bollinger." I think that is intended in the spirit of tongue in cheek. I expect it is all too literally true.

I find it strange that academics mock Gove's stance. They are supposed to know the maxim that an expert never gets the detail wrong. (For the new types of academic who doesn't: the joke means that there is no guarantee experts necessarily see the big picture.) I always remember the dingo baby case: 40 experts testified that dingoes cannot take a baby. 40 experts testified that dingoes can. By ignoring the concerns of the disadvantaged and proclaiming their own opinion (and therefore themselves) to be superior the academics who fancy themselves to be liberal display self-serving conservatism.

Like most social science research the work summarized in this article is ahistorical. In other words, the analysis shows no signs of understanding how such reform movements as populism came into existence, how such reform movements are related to other similar and not so similar movements, and what those who created such movements tried to and sometimes failed to accomplish. Sometimes the movements had no lasting impacts, sometimes mixed impacts, and sometimes impacts opposite from those desired. Most of the precursors to Trumpism are not well known today. For example, numerous tax rebellions, the Grange, Farmer’s Union, American Workers’ Party, etc. are the ancestors of Trumpism. Other movements are more well-known such as Teddy Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, The Progressive Party of the early 20th century, and Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Even Lyndon’s Johnson’s Great Society is based at least in part in movements that share much in common with Trumpism. What’s the relevance of all this? Simply that Americans have been attempting to “reform” American democracy since before the Constitution was ratified. This means Trumpism is not at all unusual or trend setting. We’ve been down the same road many, many times. And that is precisely what Trumpism is, a reform movement. In the case of Trumpism incorporating vulgarity of style and language not seen since the beginning of the White Nationalism and KKK movements of the first 50 years of the 20th century. And attracting sociopaths in greater numbers than any movement since Andrew Jackson’s “common man democracy” of the first 40 years of the 19th century. So, you see in American history, at least movements such as Trumpism are not unusual. But only a few have had lasting consequences for the nation. On a methodology note, the approach taken for this work is much too simple and orderly to capture the messiness and complexity of how actual movements such as Trumpism are created, and how individuals become involved in them. Moreover, the research begins from the wrong starting point, in my view. The authors cite social science theories that supposedly “explain” Trumpism and its participants. Then using responses to questionnaires, they search for support for and against each theory. The place to begin in understanding Trumpism and its participants is with those participants, those who scream at the rallies, burn churches, hate Muslims, respond to the oppression and disrespect they feel, hate authority figures such as police, insist they must win economically, and live bigotry each day. It’s their theories, understandings, terminology, and actions that the social scientist needs to capture and use to “explain” Trumpism to those who have not encountered it. Tough work. Much tougher and more accurate than the results of questionnaires.